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CONTRACTS-DEFAULTING

PURCHASER-RIGHT

TO

RESTITU-

TION-ADOPTION OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS IN PENNSYLVANIA-The Superior Court of

Pennsylvania, rejecting the common law rule, adopted Section 374

of the Second Restatement of Contracts, which would allow recovery by a defaulting purchaser of a business, who had also entered
into a related lease for the property, of any part of his payments
made prior to default.
Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa. Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117 (1985)
On July 25, 1973, John Lancelloti (Lancelloti) entered into an
agreement to purchase a luncheonette business owned by Albert

and Lillian Thomas, the appellees.' This agreement was limited to
the purchase of the name of the business, its good will, and the
equipment.2 The appellees also agreed that the premises upon
which the business was located was to be leased to Lancelloti.'
Upon the signing of the agreement, Lancelloti paid $25,000 as consideration," and further promised to own and operate the business
and to build an addition to the existing structure." The lease for
the rental of the property was made in a separate agreement, in
which it was specified that the agreement to build the addition was

a condition of the lease." In exchange for the promise to build the
addition, the appellees agreed that there would be no rent charged
until August 31, 1973. 7 Under the original lease, the penalty for
Lancelloti's failure to build the addition was to be an automatic
termination of the lease.8 However, an addendum made by the par1. Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa. Super. 1, 491 A.2d 117 (1985).
2. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 117. The inventory and the real estate associated with the
business were not included in the sale agreement. Id.
3. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 118. The terms of the lease agreement were that appellant
would lease the business premises for a five year term with an option for an additional five
year term. The rent was $8,000 per year and the first five year term was to begin on September 1, 1973, and run until August 30, 1978. Id.
4. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 117.
5. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 117-18. The agreement for the building of an addition to the
existing structure required that such addition would measure 16 feet by 16 feet and cost at
least $15,000. The building of this addition was to be 75 percent complete by May 1, 1974.
Id. at 3 n.1, 491 A.2d at 118 n.1.
6. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 118. For the other terms of the lease, see supra note 3.
7. Id. at 3, 491 A.2d at 118.
8. Id.
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ties modified the agreement so that Lancelloti's failure to make an
addition would be penalized by his payment to the appellees of
$6,665 as rent for the property from July 25, 1973, to the end of
the summer season.9
After Lancelloti paid the $25,000 as agreed, and began operating
the business, certain problems arose concerning the building of the
addition. 10 Lancelloti claimed that he was denied the necessary
building permit, while the appellees claimed to have obtained the
permit and presented it to Lancelloti, who refused to start construction.1 Finally, the appellees built the addition at a cost of
approximately $11,000, claiming that Lancelloti agreed to reimburse them if they built the addition. 2 In the spring of 1974, the
appellees became aware that Lancelloti was no longer interested in
operating the business, 13 and upon learning this, appellees resumed
possession of the business and opened for the 1974 summer

season.14
Lancelloti brought an assumpsit action in the Court of Common
Pleas in Delaware County 5 demanding that appellees return the
$25,000 paid as consideration for the sale agreement plus interest. 6 Appellees denied that Lancelloti was entitled to such a return and counterclaimed for damages of $52,000.17 Lancelloti, in
his answer to the counterclaim, conceded liability for the $6,665 in
rent under the terms of the addendum, but denied the remainder
of appellees' claims.' 8 The trial court found against Lancelloti on
his original claim, which allowed the appellees to keep Lancelloti's
$25,000 payment made as consideration in the sale agreement; the
trial court also found for appellees on their counterclaim in the
9. Id. The addendum also stated that all of the equipment would revert to appellees
upon appellant's default concerning the building of an addition. Id.
10. Id. at 3-4, 491 A.2d at 118. These problems arose at the end of the 1973 season. Id.
11. Id. at 4, 491 A.2d at 118.
12. Id. The addition built by appellees measured 20 feet by 40 feet. Id.
13. Id. There was no evidence that appellant paid any rent from September 1, 1973;
however, the first rent payment was not due until May 15, 1974. Id.
14. Id. Upon retaking possession of the business, appellees discovered that some of the
equipment was missing. Id.
15. Id. at 1, 491 A.2d at 117.
16. Id. at 4, 491 A.2d at 118.
17. Id. The damages included in this sum were $6,665 as rent for the property for the
1973 summer season and the remainder was to be compensation for damages to the business, as well as for causing a nervous illness in appellee Lillian Thomas. This illness necessitated that appellee Lillian Thomas be subject to bed rest and doctor's supervision for one
year after appellant's default. Id.
18. Id.
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amount of $6,665.'"
The decision of the Court of Common Pleas was appealed to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. According to President Judge
Spaeth, the appeal raised the question of "whether a defaulting
purchaser of a business who has also entered into a related lease
for the property can recover any part of his payments made prior
to default. ' 20 Judge Spaeth, speaking for the court, answered the
question in the affirmative thereby rejecting the common law rule
and adopting the position of the Second Restatement of Contracts
which permits limited restitution. 21 The case was then remanded
to the trial court for application of the Restatement rule.22
In reaching this decision, Judge Spaeth explained that the
court's adoption of the Restatement of Contracts approach represented a significant departure from the common law rule, which
was designed to prevent a breaching party from profiting from his
own wrong. 23 Another reason for the common law rule, noted by
Judge Spaeth, was that allowing a defaulting party to recover "in2' 4
vites contract-breaking and rewards morally unworthy conduct.
Following his brief discussion of the merits of the common law
rule, Judge Spaeth, citing Professor Corbin, noted that the weakness of the common law rule was that it failed to recognize that a
nonbreaching party should not be allowed to obtain a windfall
19. Id. The $6,665 that the trial court awarded the appellees on their counterclaim was
equal to the amount the parties agreed in the addendum of August 14, 1973, that appellant
would pay for failing to build the addition onto the business premises. Id.
20. Id. at 2, 491 A.2d at 117.
21. Id. The common law rule prohibited a defaulting party on a contract from recovering any part of a payment he had made. Id. at 4, 491 A.2d at 118. The position which Judge
Spaeth adopted, which allows limited restitution, is found in Section 374 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (1979). For the provisions of Section 374 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, see supra note 29.
22. On remand the trial court was directed to consider whether appellant is entitled to
restitution, or if not entitled to restitution, whether the appellees' retention of the $25,000
was reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the
difficulties of proof of loss. Id. at 10-11, 491 A.2d at 122 (quoting in part Section 374 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979)).
23. 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119 (quoting Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting
Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YA. L.J. 1013, 1014 (1931)). Professor
Corbin summarized the justification for the common law rule by stating:
It has been thought by some that restitution should always be refused, for the good
and sufficient reason that the plaintiff is one who is guilty of a breach of contract and
should never be allowed to have advantage from his own wrong; and cases are numerous that lay down such a rule, even where there is no express provision for forfeiture.
40 YALE L.J. at 1014.
24. 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119 (citing Perillo, Restitution in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 37, 50 (1981)).
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from a breach. 5
Continuing this line of reasoning, Judge Spaeth concluded that
under the common law rule, a party that breaches his contract after substantial performance has taken place is more severely penalized than a party who breaches his contract by not acting at all.26
In support of this reasoning, Judge Spaeth acknowledged the existence of a significant amount of criticism of the common law rule.27
The response to this criticism of the common law rule was, according to Judge Spaeth, the adoption of Section 357 in the Restatement of Contracts, which permitted restitution to a breaching
party as long as the breach was not willful or deliberate.28 Judge
Spaeth found the rule of the first Restatement to have been liberalized by Section 374 of the Second Restatement of Contracts,
which eliminated the requirement that the breach not be willful or
deliberate in order for the breaching party to obtain restitution.'
In adopting the position of Section 374 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, Judge Spaeth pointed out that several jurisdictions have rejected the common law rule and have permitted recovery by a defaulting party. 0 This development was deemed as
25. 81 COLUM. L. REV. at 50 (citing 40 YALE L.J. at 1013).
26. Id. Professor Corbin stated, "to allow the injured party to retain the benefit of the
past performance so rendered, without making restitution of any part of such value, is the
enforcement of a penalty or forfeiture against the contract-breaker." 40 YALE L.J. at 1013.
27. 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119. Along with the previously mentioned articles
by Professors Corbin and Perillo, Judge Spaeth also noted as being critical of the common
law rule J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 11-26 (2d ed. 1977); 5A
COR IN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1122-1135 (1964); 12 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, §§ 1473-1478 (3d ed. 1970). 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119.
28. 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
29. 431 Pa. Super. at 6-7, 491 A.2d at 119-20. Section 374 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts provides:
Restitution in Favor of Party in Breach
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), if a party justifiably refuses to perform on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged
by the other party's breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any
benefit that he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance in excess of the
loss that he has caused by his own breach.
(2) To the extent that, under the manifested assent of the parties, a party's performance is to be retained in the case of breach, that party is not entitled to restitution if
the value of the performance as liquidated damages is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1979).
30. 341 Pa. Super. at 8-9, 491 A.2d at 120-21. Judge Spaeth listed several cases in
various jurisdictions departing from the common law rule. Of the cases cited, some follow §
357 of the First Restatement of Contracts. See e.g., Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953) (citing § 357 of Restatement (First) of
Contracts in allowing restitution of the amount of a down payment in excess of the injury
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the modern trend of the law in this area.3 1 Turning then to the law
in Pennsylvania, Judge Spaeth explained that the common law
rule has been applied to contracts for the sale of real property; 2 he
then contrasted this by pointing out that since the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Pennsylvania, a breaching party has
been allowed to recovbr restitution in cases that involve contracts
for the sale of goods. 33 After concluding that the position set forth
suffered); Kitchen v. Mori, 84 Nev. 181, 437 P.2d 865 (1968) (adopted the rule of § 357 of
the Restatement (First) of Contracts and further held that even a willfully breaching vendee
can recover); and Newcomb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 114 A.2d 882 (1955) (followed § 357 of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts in holding that defaulting purchasers were entitled to
judgment for the amount of the benefit conferred upon the vendor in excess of the harm
that the vendor suffered due to the breach). Other cases cited by Judge Spaeth follow § 374
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See, e.g., Boyce Constr. Corp. v. District Bd. of
Trustees of Valencia Community College, 414 So. 2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (follows
§ 374 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts allowing recovery where the party in breach
of a contract has rendered substantial benefits to the nonbreaching party and the loss
caused by the breach does not exceed this benefit); Broersma v. Signor, 106 Idaho 156, 676
P.2d 730 (Idaho App. 1984) (approved of the rule in § 374 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts in stating that the proper damages for breach of contract are those which will
fairly compensate the injured party for his loss); Kulseth v. Rotenberger, 320 N.W.2d 920
(N. D. 1982) (followed § 374 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts in allowing a breaching
contractor to recover the benefits he conferred by his substantial performance of a contract).
Finally, some of the other cases cited by Judge Spaeth were influenced by the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-718. See, e.g., Maxey v. Glindmeyer, 379 So. 2d. 297 (Miss. 1980)
(followed the logic of the state statute which was the equivalent of § 2-718 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in allowing recovery of the excess of a seller's actual damages in
a land sale contract). 341 Pa. Super. at 8-9, 491 A.2d at 120-21.
31. 341 Pa. Super. at 9, 491 A.2d at 121, citing Quillen v. Kelly, 216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d
517 (1958). The court in Quillen, referring to the common law rule, stated:
In applying this rule, there have been instances of harshness and injustice, which
have caused a reconsideration of the same, in recent years, by the courts and by
learned and renowned scholars and text-writers on the subject of contracts. The
courts and text-writers, who do not advocate adhering to the strict common-law theory, seem to think the question of whether a plaintiff in substantial default should be
given a restitutionary remedy ought to be treated in the light of the equitable rules
that frown upon the the enforcement of penalties and forfeitures. . . . The American
Law Institute recognizes the principle presented . . . in its famous section 357 of
Restatement, Contracts.... This section has been accepted in the Federal Courts,
and most of the State Courts that have relaxed from the common-law rule use it as a
standard. This Court recognized the modern trend of the law in this respect in the
Lewis case.
Id. at 400, 140 A.2d at 520 (citations omitted).
32. 341 Pa. Super. at 9, 491 A.2d at 121, citing Kaufman Hotel & Rest. Co. v. Thomas,
411 Pa. 87, 190 A.2d 434 (1963), and Luria v. Robbins, 233 Pa. Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361
(1973).
33. 341 Pa. Super. at 10, 491 A.2d at 121. This provision is found in 13 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2718(b), which provides:
Right of buyer to restitution.-Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of
goods because of the breach of the buyer, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any
amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds: (1) the amount to which the seller
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in Section 374 of the Second Restatement of Contracts represented
a more enlightened approach than the application of the common
law rule, 34 the court remanded the principal case for consideration
as to whether the appellant was entitled to restitution under section 374 of the Restatement. 5
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tamilia set forth three reasons
why he could not agree with the majority opinion.36 The first reason given was that the majority could not cite any Pennsylvania
authority adopting the Restatement position.3 7 In light of this lack
of authority, he explained that the rejection of the common law
rule was best left to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania." The
second reason stated by Judge Tamilia was that the majority's use
of Section 2718 of the Uniform Commercial Code as partial support for its conclusion was misguided in that the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to the sale of goods. 39 Third, Judge
Tamilia contended that the majority ignored the trial court's asis entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the damages of the seller in accordance with
subsection (a); or (2) in the absence of such terms, 20% of the value of the total
performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract of $500, whichever is
smaller.
13 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2718(b) (1979). Further illustrating the undermining of the common
law rule in Pennsylvania, Judge Spaeth cited Estate of Cahen, 483 Pa. 157, 168 n.10, 394
A.2d 958, 964 n.10 (1978), as indicating that a breaching party would be able to recover for
unjust enrichment if the requirements set forth in § 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts were met. In Estate of Cahen the subject of recovery of unjust enrichment was not
presented in the text of the case, but was mentioned as a possible theory of recovery in
footnote 10. The court, however, concluded that the requirements of the Restatement were
not met in the case. 483 Pa. at 168 n.10, 394 A.2d at 964 n.10.
34. 341 Pa. Super. at 10, 491 A.2d at 121-22. Judge Spaeth stated that:
In regard to the present case, § 374 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts represents a more enlightened approach than the common law rule. "Rules of contract law
are not of punishment, the contract breaker is not an outlaw." (citations omitted).
The party who committed a breach should not be entitled to recover "any benefit
' . * in excess of the loss he has caused by his own breach." (citation omitted).
Id.
35. Id. at 10-11, 491 A.2d at 122.
36. Id. at 11-12, 491 A.2d at 122-23. (Tamilia, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 11, 491 A.2d at 122. Judge Tamilia (citing Lauria v. Robinson, 233 Pa.
Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1978)) stated that "[t]he law in Pennsylvania has been and continues to be that where a binding contract exists, and there is no allegation that the contract
itself is void or voidable, a breaching party is not entitled to recovery." 341 Pa. Super. at 11,
491 A.2d at 122.
38. 341 Pa. Super. at 11, 491 A.2d at 122.
39. Id. at 11-12, 491 A.2d at 122. Here Judge Tamilia notes that some of the cases
cited in the majority opinion may represent the modern trend, but he points out that Pennsylvania has not adopted this position for contract law purposes. Judge Tamilia also states
that the identification of the jurisdictions cited as representing this trend is for the most
part questionable. Id.
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sessment of the credibility of the witnesses in the principal case,
stating that consideration of the trial judge's assessment of witness
credibility is the most important determinant of the proper result
for this type of case under Pennsylvania law.40
The application of the common law rule, which the Superior
Court rejected in the principal case, can be seen as early as 1824 in
the Massachusetts case of Stark v. Parker.' In Stark, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a plaintiff who
contracted to work one year for the defendant, but voluntarily left
the defendant's employ before the year ended, could not recover
any compensation for the amount of time such person actually did
work for the employer. 2 The Stark decision was based on the
court's view that the performance of one year's service was a condition precedent to the employee's right to recover anything at all
under the contract. 4 - This common law rule was the unchallenged
authority in this area of the law until 1834."
40. Id. at 12, 491 A.2d at 122-23, citing Knepp v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 324 Pa. Super.
479, 471 A.2d 1257 (1984). Judge Tamilia concluded on the basis of the trial judge's findings
that the appellant used this agreement to learn the business, benefit from the acquired
trade and good will of appellees' business, and then conduct this business at a previously
owned shop the following season. Judge Tamilia believed that to allow restitution in this
case would be rewarding the appellant's bad faith. 341 Pa. Super. at 12, 491 A.2d at 122-23.
Judge Spaeth expressed his disagreement with this argument by Judge Tamilia in a footnote where he stated:
We do not share the view expressed by the dissenting opinion that "the most important determinant of the proper result in this case is the trial judge's assessment of the
witness[es]' credibility." To the contrary, as we have discussed, the trial court did not
base its decision on an assessment of credibility but on the common law rule. Thus
the court did not even consider the possibility of recovery by the breaching plaintiff.
We are remanding so that the trial court may consider whether appellant is entitled
to restitution ....
341 Pa. Super. at 11 n.5, 491 A.2d at 122 n.5. (citations omitted).
41. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 (1824).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 274. The Court in Stark found the common law rule repeatedly applied and
uniformly adhered to:
The law indeed is most reasonable in itself. It denies only to a party an advantage
from his own wrongs. It requires him to act justly by a faithful performance of his
own engagements, before he exacts the fulfillment of dependent obligations on the
part of others. It will not admit of the monstrous absurdity, that a man may voluntarily and without cause violate his agreement, and make the very breach of that agreement the foundation of an action which he could not maintain under it.
Id. at 275.
44. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, COwrACTS § 11-26, at 427 (2d ed. 1977) (hereinafter J.
CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO). For other cases following the common law approach during this
period, see, e.g., Ketchum v. Evertson, 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 359, 7 Am. Dec. 384 (1816) (it would
be an alarming doctrine to allow a plaintiff to make his own violation of a contract the basis
of an action to recover money); Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Me. 454 (1827) (the reason for the
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The first case to depart from the common law rule followed in
Stark was Britton v. Turner," wherein the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire held that a defaulting party could "recover a reasonable sum for the service [such party] has actually
performed.'

46

To be sure, the factual setting of Britton was re-

markably similar to that of Stark as both cases involved the partial
performance of a special labor contract by an employee. In concluding that the defaulting party was entitled to recover a reasonable sum for the services actually performed, the Britton court em47
phasized that the common law rule was unjust in its application.
As explained by the Britton court, the common law rule favored
the breaching party that totally failed to meet any contractual obligations over one that substantially completed performance of the
contract before the breach occurred. 8 As a result of the landmark

decision in Britton, the legal world soon divided into two legal
4
caMps. "

common law rule is that one should not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong).
45. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
46. Id. at 486.
471d.. Noting the common law rule, the Court stated:
It has been held, upon contracts of this kind for labor to be performed at a specified
price, that the party who voluntarily fails to fulfill the contract by performing the
whole labor contracted for, is not entitled to recover anything for the labor actually
performed, however much he may have done towards the performance, and this has
been considered the settled rule of law upon this subject.

Id.
48.

Id. at 486-87. Describing the unjust result of applying the common law rule the

Britton court stated:
By operation of this rule, then, the party who attempts performance may be placed in
a much worse situation than he who wholly disregards his contract, and the other
party may receive much more, by the breach of the contract, than the injury which he
has sustained by such breach, and more than he could be entitled to were he seeking
to recover damages by an action.
Id. For a discussion of Britton v. Turner, see generally Ashley, Britton v. Turner, 24 YALE
L.J. 544 (1915); Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Re- Viewed, 83 U. PA.
L. REV.825 (1935); Williston, The Defaulting Employee-A Correction, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 68
(1935).
49. 6 N.H. at 487. See also Mulder, The Defaulting Plaintiff in North Carolina, 15
N.C.L. REV. 255 (1937). This development in the law was thus described:
For more than a century the plight of the defaulting plaintiff has been a prolific
source of controversy among courts and legal scholars. Until 1834 the unpaid willful
defaulter was generally not entitled to judicial relief. This was the "common-law"
rule. But in that year the Supreme Court of New Hampshire fired the first shot in a
hundred years' legal war. Disregarding the hallowed precedents of the "common-law
rule" that court, in the case of Britton v. Turner, created the "modern rule", by
granting succor (to the extent of $95) to a defaulting laborer. The reverberations of
that shot threw the legal world into two camps, which have since then filled reams
and reams of paper with attacks upon and defenses of the simple decision.
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Following the decision in Britton v. Turner, a split of authority
developed among the jurisdictions, as some jurisdictions continued
to follow the common law rule while others adopted the modern
0 Although the common law rule reapproach set forth in Britton.5
mained the prevailing view through the 1920's,"1 there were cases
in which a defaulting party was allowed recovery. One such case
was McDaniel v. Gray & Co., 6 2 wherein the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that where a vendor chose rescission of a contract as
his remedy against a defaulting purchaser, an implied obligation
was created on the vendor's part to restore the amount of purchase
money paid by the vendee.5 s It is important to note, however, that
restoration of the purchase money by the vendor to the vendee in
McDaniel was limited to the amount paid by the vendee in excess
of the vendor's actual loss resulting from the breach." Another
case which allowed a defaulting party to recover was Malmberg v.
Baugh,5 5 wherein the Supreme Court of Utah held that a default15 N.C.L. REv. at 255.
50. See generally Corbin, The Right of A Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of
Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014-16 (1931).
51. Annotation, Vendee's Right to Recover Amount Paid Under Executing Contract
for Sale, 59 A.L.R. 189, 190 (1929). Dealing specifically with defaulting purchasers on land
sale contracts it was stated:
The doctrine has been asserted that no rule in respect to a contract for the sale of
real estate is better settled than that the party who has advanced money or done an
act in part performance of the agreement, and then stops short and refuses to proceed to its ultimate conclusions, the other party being ready and willing to proceed
and fulfill all his stipulations according to the contract, will not be permitted to recover back what has thus been advanced or done. (citation omitted).
Id. See also J. CALAMA-U AND J. PERILLO, supra note 44, at 427 (the common law rule probably still contitutes the weight of authority). For cases applying the common law rule, see,
e.g., Frost v. Frost, 11 Me. 235 (1834)(grantee who made partial payments on the purchase
of land could not recover such payments after the grantor had reclaimed the land subsequent to the breach); Wheeler v. Mather, 56 IMI.240 (1870)(a defaulting vendee cannot recover any part of the amount previously paid); Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881) (refusal to allow defaulting vendee to recover installment payments made to vendor prior to
default); Roberts v. Yaw, 62 Kan. 43, 61 P. 409 (1900) (no relief to a defaulting party);
Francis v. Shrader, 38 Cal. App. 592, 177 P. 168 (1918) (vendor could retain installment
payments paid by a defaulting vendee even in the absence of forfeiture clauses in the contract); Flagler v. Kroonen, 16 Cal. App. 359, 214 P. 1006 (1923) (a defaulting purchaser
cannot recover money paid on the purchase price even in the event of a subsequent default
by the vendor); and Toomey v. Sporn, 145 Okla. 38, 291 P. 22 (1930) (a vendee who defaults
after partial performance is not entitled to recover money previously advanced before such
default).
52. 69 Ga. 433 (1882).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 436-37.
55. 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923). In discussing the allowance of recovery for a defaulting purchaser the Malmberg court stated:
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ing purchaser could recover payments made in excess of the vendor's damages where there was no forfeiture clause in the contract
of sale.56
In discussing the cases in which a defaulting purchaser was seeking restitution during the years since Britton v. Turner and up until 1931, Professor Corbin explained that in many of the cases
where restitution was denied, the amount paid by the defaulting
purchaser was very small, and thus not likely to be greater than
the damages suffered by the vendor. 7 Professor Corbin further
stated that in order for a defaulting purchaser to recover, the
amount of the installment paid must be greater than the injury
caused by the breach.58 He concluded that recovery should be allowed in all situations where the installments paid by a defaulting
party are in excess of the injury caused by the breach.59
Although many of the cases during this period did not follow the
position argued by Professor Corbin, 60 one case which did lend
support to Professor Corbin's position was Sandusky v. Walter. 1
In Sandusky, the Missouri court denied recovery because the vendor's damages, as a result of the breach, were greater than the cash
There is nothing in the contract, unless it can be read between the lines, by which
they agreed to forfeit payments on the purchase price. Equity abhors a forfeiture, and
the law does not favor it. This is elementary; in fact, it is axiomatic in every jurisdiction of the country, and we feel justified in propounding the question: Why should
anything more than compensatory damages be allowed in cases of this kind, especially where there is no stipulation in the agreement upon which to base the allowance? It is ordinarily considered oppressive and intolerable to enforce a forfeiture
amounting to punitive damages even where it is expressly agreed to by the parties. A
fortiori, such damages should not be awarded where they are not expressly stipulated
in the contract.
Id. at 342, 218 P. at 979. Corbin referred to the above quoted passage as one of the best
discussions on the subject of allowing a defaulting purchaser to recover restitution. 40 YALE
L. at 1016 n.3.
56. 62 Utah at 342, 218 P. at 979-80.
57. 40 YALE L.J. at 1023-24.
58. Id. at 1025.
59. Id. at 1025-26. Here Professor Corbin states that:
In some cases, however, the installments paid are large in comparison, and sometimes
the plaintiff in fact shows or offers to show that the injury is less. In cases like this,
the plaintiff should not be denied the opportunity to prove what he asserts, although
often his evidence may be so indefinite and uncertain that it should be thrown out. If
he can and does show by proper evidence that the defendant is holding an amount of
money as a penalty rather than as compensation for injury, he should be given judgment for restitution of that amount.
Id.
60. Id. at 1023-1026 nn.19-22 and accompanying text.
61. 272 S.W. 1045 (Mo. App. 1925).
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payment previously made by the defaulting party."2 Although not
specifically addressing the issue, the Sandusky court left open the
possibility of recovery if the prior payment made by the defaulting
purchaser was, in fact, greater in amount than the vendor's damages suffered as a result of the breach."3
In response to a growing amount of criticism of the common law
rule, the First Restatement of Contracts in 1932 adopted Section
357, which allowed restitutionary recovery for a party who had
breached his contract.6 4 Even so, Section 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts excluded a defaulting purchaser from recovery
in cases where the breach was willful and deliberate. 5 Professor
Corbin, in his Treatise on Contracts, noted that in the wake of the
publication of Section 357, few decisions have been handed down
denying restitution to a breaching party, and of those that have
denied restitution, some are correct because the payments made by
the defaulting party were exceeded by the injury caused by the
breach."6
62. Id. at 1047.
63. See 40 YALE L.J. at 1025 n.20 (1931) and accompanying text for further discussion
and cases on this topic.
64. 341 Pa. Super. at 5, 491 A.2d at 119. Section 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts states as follows:
Section 357. Restitution in Favor of a Plaintiff Who is Himself in Default.
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is justified
therein by the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition, but
the plaintiff has rendered a part performance under the contract that is a net benefit
to the defendant, the plaintiff can get judgment, except as stated in Subsection (2),
for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused to the defendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding a ratable portion of the agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiff's breach or non-performance is not willful and deliberate, or
(b) the defendant, with knowledge that the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the
past performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains property received although
its return in specie is still not unreasonably difficult or injurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part performance if it is merely
a payment of earnest money, or if the contract provides that it may be retained and it
is not so greatly in excess of the defendant's harm that the provision is rejected as
imposing a penalty.
(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit from the plaintiff's part performance is
the amount by which he has been enriched as a result of such performance unless the
facts are those stated in Subsection (1b), in which case it is the price fixed by the
contract for such part performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of
the total contract price.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932).
65. Id. at § 357(1)(a).
66. 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1129 (1964). Professor Corbin stated:
It has been thought by some that restitution should always be refused, for the good
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Following the publication of Section 357, several jurisdictions
departed from the common law rule and allowed a defaulting party
to receive restitution where the prior payments made by the
breaching party were in excess of the injury caused by any such
breach. One of the leading cases to allow such recovery was Freed67
man v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish,
wherein the Supreme Court of California held that a defaulting
purchaser who had willfully breached his contract could still recover the excess of his down payment over the injury suffered by
the vendor as a result of a breach.6 8 Another case that allowed a
defaulting purchaser to recover was Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
Miehle Printing Press & Manufacturing Co., 69 wherein the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit based its allowance of restitution
upon a determination that the vendor had not been harmed by the
vendee's breach.70 The Amtorg Trading case is significant in that
the Second Circuit, applying federal law, stated that the federal
courts have accepted the position of Section 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts. 1 In Marshall v. Patzman,72 the Supreme
and sufficient reason that the plaintiff is one who is guilty of a breach of contract and
should never be allowed to have advantage from his own wrong; and cases are numerous that have stated such a rule, even where there is no express forfeiture. Few of
these, however, have been decided since the publication of Restatements, Contracts,
sec. 357 (1932); some decisions since that date are sustainable because the one in
default failed to prove that the payments made by him exceeded the injury caused by
his breach.
Id. at 37-39.
67. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951). See Major-Blakeney Corp. v. Jenkins, 121 Cal.
App. 2d 325, 263 P.2d 655 (1953) and Harriman v. Tatik, 56 Cal. 2d 805, 366 P.2d 486, Cal.
Rptr. 134, (1961) for other California cases which followed Freedman v. Rector, Wardens &
Vestrymen of St. Matthais Parish. See also Annotation, Right of Vendee in Default to Recover Back Money Paid on the Contract and Withheld by the Vendor as Forfeited, 31
A.L.R. 2d 8, 11-12 (1953) (stating that the common law rule was still followed in most jurisdictions as of 1953).
68. 230 P.2d at 631.
69. 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953). See Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir.
1933) and Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, 143 F. 929 (6th Cir. 1906) for other federal
cases adopting the Restatement position.
70. 206 F.2d at 108.
71. Id. at 106. The reason that federal law was applied in this case was that the controversy involved checks issued by the United States; thus, federal law took precedence over
state law. Id. at 108.
72. 81 Ariz. 367, 306 P.2d 287 (1957). In this case, the plaintiff entered into a contract
to buy $16,500 in corporate stock. Plaintiff made $8,000 in payment toward this purchase,
but later abandoned the deal. The defendant had claimed the $8,000 as liquidated damages;
however, the Court went on to call such a forfeiture unconscionable. Id. See also Guill v.
Pugh, 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W. 2d 574 (1949) (forfeiture was not allowed where the vendor
resold following the purchaser's default); Bennett v. Adams, 238 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. App.
1951)(vendor who resells may not keep prior payment made by defaulting purchaser); Bern-
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Court of Arizona held that it was error to allow a seller to retain a
payment made before the buyer's default in the absence of a showing as to the amount of damages caused by the breach. T5
Although a trend was developing in favor of adoption of the Restatement of Contracts approach as delineated under Section 357,
the existing conflict between this more modern approach and the
common law rule had still not been resolved through the 1960's
and 1970's."4 In spite of this conflict, some cases are illustrative of
the developing trend. One such case is DeLeon v. Aldrete, wherein
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that when a vendor rescinds a contract on the basis of a vendee's default, such vendor
must make restitution on the amount of payments made by the
vendee in excess of the injury caused by a breach.75 Significantly,
in reaching this decision, the DeLeon court acknowledged that although the common law rule was arguably still the majority rule
throughout the several jurisdictions, Texas adopted the Restatement of Contracts approach. 7 Another such case is Kitchin v.
Mori,7 wherein the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a defaultstein v. Rosenzweig, 1 N.J. Super. 48, 62 A.2d 147 (1948) (recovery not allowed but court
noted that recovery would be allowed if the payment by the defaulting party was so large
that retention of it by the vendor would constitute a penalty); Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc.,
52 N.J. Super. 299, 145 A.2d 471 (1958) (stated that the rule in § 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts was impliedly adopted in Bernstein v. Rosenzweig); Newcomb v. Ray, 99
N.H. 463, 114 A.2d 882 (1955) (allowed recovery of benefit conferred by breach in excess of
injury to vendor following section 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts). See also Annotation, Right of Vendee in Default to Recover Back Money Paid on the Contract and
Withhold by the Vendor as Forfeited, 31 A.L.R. 2d 8, 19 (1955) (where it is stated that as of
1953 only California, Connecticut and Utah have firmly established a rule against forfeiture
contrary to the common law rule).
73. 306 P.2d at 289-90.
74. DeLeon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W. 2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
75. Id. at 162-63, 164.
76. Id. at 162. Here the court stated:
What is generally described as the majority rule in this country is that a defaulting
purchaser cannot recover any money paid by him under the contract to the vendor
even though, as a result of the purchaser's breach, the vendor has abandoned all idea
of further performance and retains the money, not for application on the purchase
price, but as forfeited.
The Texas decisions contain some broad general language which, if accepted at face
value, would indicate that our courts are committed to the majority or 'forfeiture'
rule. However, it is apparent that the Texas courts have not adopted a dogmatic rule
of forfeiture but, instead, have embraced the more salutory rule that the vendor must
make restitution if the principles of equity so require.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. 84 Nev. 181, 437 P.2d at 865 (1968). See also Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing
Corp. of Am., 64 Ca. 2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966) (willfully defaulting
purchaser under contract to purchase realty may recover excess of part payments over damages caused by his breach); Nelson v. Hazel, 91 Idaho 850, 433 P.2d 120 (1967) (in an action
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ing buyer could recover the money paid as a down payment upon a
showing that such payment exceeded the amount of a seller's injury.7 8 This decision was based on the Supreme Court of Nevada's
'79
decision to follow "the great weight of authority.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Fuller v. Rosinski,8 0 relied on Section 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts in concluding that a defaulting contractor could recover if the work such
contractor had completed enhanced the value of the property.8 1 In
Golden v. Golden,82 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a defaulting vendee's right to any recovery rests upon.a showing that a
vendor would be unjustly enriched if such vendor is permitted to
keep a vendee's payments made prior to a default of the contract. 8
The Golden Court further reasoned that a vendor should be entitled to set off the amount of any loss suffered as a result of a
breach against a vendee's claim for the return of his payments. 4
To be sure, both Professors Corbin and Williston believe that the
Restatement of Contracts approach, which permits a defaulting
purchaser to recover payments tendered in excess of a vendor's
damages, has become the majority rule.s5 Professors Calamari and
for breach of contract damages should only be allowed to the extent necessary to compensate the injured party).
78. 437 P.2d at 866.
79. Id.
80. 79 Wash. 2d 719, 488 P.2d 1061 (1971). See also Nordin Construction Co. v. City
of Nome, 489 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1971) (contractor who substantially fails in performance
cannot rely on the contract for recovery, but must prove that an actual benefit was conferred by his work to recover on restitutionary theory).
81. 488 P.2d at 1063.
82. 273 Or. 506, 541 P.2d 1397 (1975).
83. 541 P.2d at 1399-1400.
84. Id. at 511, 541 P.2d at 1400. See also Washington v. Claassen, 218 Kan. 577, 545
P.2d 387 (1976) (commenting on § 357 of the First Restatement of Contracts, the Court
noted that recovery can be had by a defaulting purchaser where prior payments exceed the
vendor's damages, but further pointing out that recovery is denied when the vendor remains
willing and able to perform his part of the contract).
85. 5A CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 1122. Professor Corbin in discussing the common law
rule stated that:
Statements are sometimes made that a plaintiff who is himself in substantial default
in performing a contract can maintain no action for any compensation for the part
performance that he may have rendered. Such a broad statement, however, is not
supported by the actual decision.
Id. 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1473 (1970). Discussing both the common law and the
modem rules, Professor Williston states:
On the one hand, it seems a violation of the terms of a contract to allow a plaintiff in
default to recover - to allow a party to stop when he pleases and sell his part performance at a value fixed by the jury to the defendant whose only agreement is to pay
for full performance.
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Perillo, on the other hand, believe that the common law rule is still
the majority rule, but note that the Restatement of Contracts approach initially set forth in Britton v. Turner is the modern trend
currently enjoying "fairly wide acceptance."88
Despite the fact that the trend of the law is clearly in favor of
allowing a defaulting purchaser to recover, some jurisdictions have
steadfastly chosen to adhere to the common law rule, most notably, New York. The New York Court of Appeals strongly voiced its
approval of the common law rule in Lawrence v. Miller.87 In 1967,
the New York Court of Appeals had the opportunity to use 32
Beechwood Corp. v. Fisher as a vehicle for adopting the Restatement of Contracts approach.88 In Fisher, a defaulting purchaser
urged the Court of Appeals to overrule prior New York case law
which held that a defaulting purchaser could not recover any part
of prior installments paid to the vendor.8 In a memorandum decision, the Fisher court followed the precedential authority of Lawrence v. Miller and was unwilling to adopt the Restatement of
Contracts approach. 0 The Fisher court apparently felt that the
common law rule followed in Lawrence v. Miller was sufficiently
well established such that any discussion as to its continuing validity was unwarranted. As the New York Court of Appeals has not
again been faced with this issue since its decision in Fisher, it
would seem that the common law rule remains firmly entrenched
in New York despite the growing acceptance of the Restatement
approach in other jurisdictions. 1
In 1979, the American Law Institute adopted the Second Restatement of Contracts. Section 374 of this Restatement deals with
a breaching party's right to recover payments made prior to a
breach. Although Section 374 is consistent in following Section 357
On the other hand, to deny recovery often gives the defendant more than fair compensation for the injury he has sustained and imposes a forfeiture (which the law
generally abhors) on the plaintiff. The mores of the time and place will often determine which policy will be followed. But the second of these opposing policies has
steadily increased in favor and probably represents the weight of authority.
Id. at 221-22. But cf. 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW oF REsTrrtriON § 4.4, at 568 (1978) (Professor
Palmer believes that no valid generalization can be made regarding when a defaulting ven-

dee can recover).
86. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, supra note 44, at 428. See supra notes 31 and 77 and
accompanying text for cases discussing the modern trend in the law.
87. 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
88. 19 N.Y. 2d 1008, 228 N.E.2d 823, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (1967).
89. Id. at 823-24.
90. Id.
91. J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, supra note 44, at 427 and n.75.
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of the First Restatement of Contracts in limiting the extent of recovery to an amount in excess of an injury suffered as a result of a
breach, Section 374 significantly liberalizes Section 357 by not excluding from recovery those parties that willfully breach their contracts.9 2 Since the publication of Section 374, three jurisdictions
other than Pennsylvania have taken the opportunity to comment
on it.
The District Court of Appeals of Florida favorably cited Section
374 in reasoning that a defaulting party could recover the benefit
conferred on a claim of quantum meruit in Boyce Construction
Corp. v. District Board of Trustees." The Florida court held, however, that the defaulting party in that case was not entitled to recovery because such party did not plead the issue of quantum meruit at trial and because there was no evidence that such issue was
tried by the express or implied consent of the non-breaching
party. 9 Another court which has adopted Section 374 of the Restatement of Contracts is the Supreme Court of North Dakota. In
Kulseth v. Rotenberger," the court quoted subsection (1) of Section 374 as support for its decision to uphold an award in favor of
a defaulting contractor, on a theory of quantum meruit, for the
value of the benefits that such contractor had conferred on the
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1979). See supra note 29 for text of
Section 374. Comment (a).to Section 374 states:
Restitution in spite of breach. The rule stated in this section applies where a party,
after having rendered part performance, commits a breach by either non-performance
or repudiation that justifies the other party in refusing further performance. It is
often unjust to allow the injured party to retain the entire benefit of the part performance rendered by the party in breach without paying anything in return. The
party in breach is, in any case, liable for the loss caused by his breach. If the benefit
received by the injured party does not exceed that loss, he owes nothing to the party
in breach. If the benefit received exceeds that loss, the rule stated in this Section
generally gives the party in breach the right to recover the excess in restitution. If the
injured party has a right to specific performance and remains willing and able to
perform, he may keep what he has received and sue for specific performance of the
balance.
Id.
93. 414 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Citing Section 374 the court stated:
Where a party in breach of a contract has rendered substantial benefits to the nonbreaching party which it would be unjust to forfeit without any payment, and the loss
occasioned by the breach does not equal or exceed the benefit, then the defaulting
party may recover the excess of the benefit over the loss.
Id.
94. Id. at 636-37. The court then went on to remand the case for a new trial. Id. at
637.
95. 320 N.W. 2d 920 (N.D. 1982).
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non-breaching party.9 6 Significantly, the Kulseth court noted that
the recovery by the breaching party was not premised on contract
values.9 7 In Broersma v. Sinoir,9 8 the Court of Appeals of Idaho
quoted subsection (1) of Section 374 of the Second Restatement of
Contracts as being supportive of the proposition that the purpose
of awarding damages in breach of contract cases is to fully compensate an injured party for losses sustained, not to punish a
breaching party."e The court in Broersma further relied on Section
374 in allowing recovery by a breaching party to the extent that
the injured parties were benefited in excess of their loss. 10 0
Pennsylvania applied the common law rule as early as 1831 in
Shaw v. Lewistown & Kishacoquillas Turnpike Co., 10 1 wherein the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that one who himself has not
completely lived up to the terms of a contract may not recover for
the breach of the other party. 10 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again relied on the common law rule in Martin v.
Schoenberger,0 5 holding that a breaching party cannot recover for
past performance of an entire contract where such party has failed
96. Id. at 923.
97. Id. at 922. Describing the theory of recovery on which the claim was based, the
court stated that:
If a contractor does not substantially perform he is entitled, at most, to the value of
the benefit that he has conferred upon the owner under a theory of quantum meruit
or unjust enrichment, and not the contract price minus the defects.
Id.
98. 106 Idaho 156, 161, 676 P.2d 730, 734 (Idaho App. 1984).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 2 Pen. & W. 454 (Pa. 1831).
102. Id. at 461.
103. 8 Watts & Serg. 367 (Pa. 1845). Discussing the rule in Pennsylvania, the Court
stated:
To permit a man to recover for part performance of an entire contract, or to permit
him to recover on his agreement where he has failed to perform, would tend to demoralize the whole country. If the law were so, a man would just perform as much of
his contract as would suit his convenience or cupidity; all faith and fair dealing would
be at an end, and all confidence between man and man would be destroyed. The law
is settled that he who has performed a special agreement to do a particular thing may
recover the stipulated price of it. . . .But if there be but part performance by the
plaintiff of his part of the contract, he cannot recover.
Id. at 368-69 (citation omitted). See also Quigley v. DeHass, 82 Pa. 267 (1876) (the general
rule is that there can be no recovery for the part performance of an entire contract); Boyd v.
McCullough, 137 Pa. 7, 20 A. 630 (1890) (vendee cannot recover what he has paid on a
contract if he subsequently defaults; recovery may only be based upon full compliance with
the contract); Crawford v. McKinney, 165 Pa. 605, 30 A. 1045 (1895) (general rule not applicable to severable contracts; contractor who is to be paid installments as the work progresses may recover unpaid installments which were due and payable prior to his default).
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in the performance of his part.10 4 In yet another case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Hartman v. Meighan'0 5 that a party
that has willfully defaulted on an entire contract may not thereafter recover for any past performance even though a non-breaching
party has suffered no injury as a result of such default.
Despite the aforementioned Pennsylvania decisions which have
adhered to the common law rule, some erosion of the common law
rule had occurred in Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of the Restatement of Contracts approach. In Atlantic City Tire and Rubber Corp. v. Southwark Foundry & Machine Co., 0 6 the common
law rule was held to apply to contracts for the sale of goods. In
Atlantic City Tire, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
that a buyer who defaulted after completing partial performance
on a sales contract could not thereafter recover any payments that
had been advanced to the seller. 0 7 Since this case was decided,
however, Pennsylvania has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code, which permits a breaching purchaser on a contract for the
sale of goods to recover under a restitution theory.'0 8 Another indication that Pennsylvania has experienced some doubt about continuing to apply the common law doctrine can be seen in Estate of
Cahen,10 9 wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a claim
for compensation by a trustee of an inter vivos trust who resigned
before the time of distribution. 1 0 The compensation which the
court denied was to be calculated at the time of distribution.'
The court did note, however, that if a breaching fiduciary could
recover for unjust enrichment, the requirements of Section 357 of
2
the First Restatement of Contracts would have to be met."
104. 8 Watts & Serg. 367, 369 (Pa. 1845).
105. 171 Pa. 46, 33 A. 123 (1895). For later cases following the common law rule see
Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, 79 A. 772 (1911) (there may be no recovery of prior payment
by purchaser unless the vendors were in default); Dluge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 344, 141 A. 230
(1928) (quoting Martin v. Schoenberger, the Court held that defaulting purchaser of defendant's stock of merchandise could not recover a $3,000 payment made on account); Messinger v. Lee, 163 Pa. Super. 297, 60 A.2d 599 (1948) (quoting Sanders v. Brock, the court
held that defaulting purchaser was not entitled to recover deposit money paid on a contr'
to purchase real estate).
106. 289 Pa. 569, 137 A. 807 (1927).
107. Id.
108. 341 Pa. Super. at 10, 491 A.2d at 121. See supra note 33 for text of Peru, -lvania
statute allowing recovery on contracts for the sale of goods.
109. 483 Pa. 157, 394 A.2d 958 (1978).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 168 n.10, 394 A.2d at 964 n.10. The reason given by the Court to show that
recovery was not proper in this case was that the trustee had not demonstrated that it had
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With respect to claims involving contracts for the sale of real
property, it appears that Pennsylvania courts have strictly adhered
to the common law rule.11 3 In Kaufman Hotel & Restaurant Co. v.
Thomas,1 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the denial of
a claim set forth by defaulting purchasers seeking to recover payments which had been made for three years prior to their default,
as well as for reimbursement for all the improvements and additions which such defaulting purchasers had made on the property.1 15 As the basis for its decision, the Thomas court stated that
the settled rule in Pennsylvania was such that a defaulting vendee
on a contract for the sale of real estate could not recover payments
made prior to default as long as the vendor was ready and willing
to perform his obligations under the contract."" This rule was
conferred a net benefit on the trusts in excess of the harm caused by its breach. Id.
113. 341 Pa. Super. at 9, 491 A.2d at 121.
114. 411 Pa. 87, 190 A.2d 434 (1963). The specific contract of sale in this case had a
provision stating that upon default the vendors were to confess a judgment in ejectment
under the terms of the agreement and then take possession of the property from the vendees. Recovery of prior payments made before default was denied the vendees even though
the vendors had not first entered a judgment against the vendees as was required under the
contract. Id.
115. Id. at 94, 190 A.2d at 438.
116. Id. at 92-93, 190 A.2d at 436-37. Describing the prevailing rule in Pennsylvania,
the Court stated as follows:
Where the contract is entire and the default was wilful and deliberate in the sense
that it was entirely intentional and without any excuse whatever, the defaulting party
ordinarily will not be permitted to recover for the part he performed prior to his
repudiation of the agreement .... Furthermore, the law will not create in favor of
one who is a wilful and deliberate defaulter against the person injured by the nonperformance of the entire contract, any implied contractual obligation to recover for part
performed, either on the theory of a quantum meruit or on the equitable theory of
restitution for unjust enrichment.
Id. at 92-93, 190 A.2d at 436-37, (quoting SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE, CONTRACTS § 498 (1955)).See, e.g., Martin v. Schoenberger, 8 Watts & Serg. 367 (Pa. 1845);
Producers Coke Co. v. Hillman, 243 Pa. 313, 90 A. 144 (1914); Wright v. Barber, 270 Pa. 186,
113 A. 200 (1921).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to note that while the authority it cited for the
general rule related to contracts for the sale of personal property, that rule also applied to
contracts for the sale of real estate. Quoting Sanders v. Brock, 230 Pa. 609, 79 A. 772 (1911),
the Court stated:
The settled rule in respect to contracts for the sale of real estate is that the party who
has advanced the money, or done an act in part performance of the agreement, and
then stopped short and refuses to proceed to its ultimate conclusion, the other party
being ready and willing to proceed and fulfill all his stipulations according to the
contract will not be permitted to recover back what has thus been advanced or done.
411 Pa. at 93, 190 A.2d at 437. See also Dluge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 141 A. 230 (1928);
Wasserman v. Steinman, 304 Pa. 150, 155 A. 302 (1931); Roberts v. Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 159
A. 870 (1932).
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again followed in Luria v. Robbins,"7 wherein the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania denied a defaulting vendee recovery of any portion
of a down payment made under an oral contract for the purchase
of real estate. "'
Despite what appeared to be a well settled rule in Pennsylvania,
the Common Pleas Court of Cumberland County allowed a vendee
who breached an oral installment contract for the sale of real estate to recover payments made prior to default in Cashman v.
Sheaffer." 9 Significantly, the recovery in Cashman was limited to
contracts not containing forfeiture clauses. The Cashman court
noted that its conclusion to allow recovery was consistent with the
view stated in Section 374 of the Second Restatement of Con1 To justify reaching this conclusion, the Cashman court
tracts. 20
recognized the development of another line of cases beginning with
Howard v. Stillwagon"I in 1911, in which the common law rule did
not bar the recovery of a defaulting vendee under a contract for
the sale of real estate."12 The Cashman court deftly distinguished
the line of cases applying the common law rule, which it designated as Sanders and its progeny,"2 by reasoning that those cases
involved contracts which specifically contained forfeiture
clauses."14 However, it should be noted that the line of cases which
the Cashman court attempted to distinguish did not rely on the
fact that the contracts in question contained forfeiture clauses. Instead, they stated the general rule followed in Pennsylvania in
broad terminology, to include all contracts for the sale of real
1

estate.

5

In deciding to reject the common law rule in Pennsylvania,
Judge Spaeth noted that it had previously been followed in situa117. 223 Pa. Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1973).
118. Id. at 465, 302 A.2d at 366.
119. 30 D. & C.3d 512 (1984).
120. Id. at 518.
121. 232 Pa. 625, 81 A. 807 (1911). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Howard v.
Stillwagon held that a defaulting vendee was entitled to recover the amount he had paid on
the purchase price where the contract authorized the vendor in the case of default to treat
the contract as void and to confess judgment against the vendee in ejectment. The court

noted that the vendee was entitled to recovery because the vendor had exercised the options
and the contract did not contain a forfeiture clause, stating that "[tihe rights of each of the
Id. at 628, 81 A. at 808.
parties must be found in the agreement.
122. Id. at 629, 81 A. at 808.
123. See supra notes 95-97, 103-105 and accompanying text.
124. 30 D. & C.3d at 517.
125. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. E.g., Luria v. Robbins, supra
note 105 and accompanying text (recovery denied to defaulting vendee on an oral contract
for the sale of real estate; thus, there was no provision for forfeiture in the contract).
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tions involving contracts for the sale of real estate. 126 However,
Judge Spaeth concluded that Section 374 of the Second Restatement of Contracts provided "a more enlightened approach than
the common law rule, '2 7 and further concluded that application of
the common law rule operated to create a forfeiture as well as unjustly enriching a non-breaching seller.128 Thus, in Lancellotti v.
Thomas, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania broke with a long line
of precedent which had heretofore followed the common law rule,
opting instead to adopt the rules set forth in Section 374 of the
Second Restatement of Contracts.
Historically, the common law position has been justified through
the rationalization that such a position acts to prevent a breaching
party from profiting from his own wrong. 29 This argument has
been countered with the proposition that denying defaulting purchasers from recovering payments made prior to defaults, which
are in excess of the damages suffered by non-breaching vendors,
acts as a penalty or a forfeiture on breaching purchasers. " In examining these two arguments, it is important to consider the purpose of contract law in general, which is to place the parties in the
positions they would enjoy had the breach not occurred.'' Once
this principle is established, the common law rule cannot withstand close scrutiny. Application of the common law rule clearly
allows the non-breaching party to be more than fairly compensated
for another's breach of contract. In cases where a defaulting purchaser's payments made prior to default are in excess of the damages suffered by the vendor, the common law rule will allow the
vendor to keep the whole amount of the prior payment. Thus, the
common law rule acts to give the vendor more than he was meant
to receive under the general principle of compensatory damages in
the contract law.
126. 341 Pa. Super. at 9, 491 A.2d at 121.
127. Id. at 10, 491 A.2d at 122.
128. Id. at 2, 491 A.2d at 117.
129. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 26 and 83 and accompanying text.
131. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 44, at § 14-4. Professors Calamari and Perillo
describing the general standard for damages for the breach of a contract state:
For breach of contract the law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the
same economic position he would have had if the contract had been performed. This
involves an award of both the "losses caused and gains prevented by the defendant's
breach,in excess of savings made possible."
Id. at 521. See also 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed 1968); U.C.C. § 1-106; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES §

137 (1935).
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Despite the adherence to the common law rule allowing vendors
to keep prior payments made by a defaulting purchaser, the law in
Pennsylvania has generally frowned upon forfeitures. In Artzerounian v. Denetriades,13 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
that forfeitures are not favorites of the law. In light of this fact, it
seems difficult to believe that Pennsylvania has allowed the common law rule to persist as the governing law of this jurisdiction for
such a long period of time. The common law rule in no way acts to
protect non-breaching vendors. In fact, the rule now adopted by
Judge Spaeth allows vendors to recover the fair amount of compensation to which such non-breaching parties are entitled."' 3 Although the rejection of the common law rule in this area of the law
is long overdue, it is a most welcome development in the contract
law of Pennsylvania. Judge Spaeth should be praised for his willingness to recognize the modern trend of the law in this country
away from the imposition of an unfair penalty upon a defaulting
purchaser.
William G. Young

132. 276 Pa. 303, 120 A.2d 142 (1923). See also Fogel Refrigerator Co. v. Oteri, 391 Pa.
188, 137 A.2d 225 (1958); Barraclough v. The Atlantic Refining Co., 230 Pa. Super. 276, 326

A.2d 477 (1974); 5 S.

WnLuSTON,

A TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 770, at 641 (3d ed.

1961) ("a forfeiture deprives a man of what he previously possessed"). This principle has
been stated as recently as 1985 in Kalina V. Eckert, 345 Pa. Super. 220, 497 A.2d 1384
(1985) (equity abhors a forfeiture and is hesitant to enforce one).
133. See Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUML L.
REV. 37, 50 (1981). Professor Perillo states that:
The Restatement (Second) extends the Britton v. Turner doctrine to its logical conclusion: the party in breach is entitled to restitution of "any benefit he has conferred
. . . in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach" whether or not his
breach was wilful. Rules of contract law are not rules of punishment; the contract
breacher is not an outlaw.

